A surprising contact on the professional network. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, most likely a young woman, based in China. The chance to earn around £20,000 on the side writing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company peppered with confidential or privileged insights. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, China’s influential intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – prompting the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, seeking governmental, commercial, defense and scientific classified information. However a new campaign aimed at elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
An espionage alert was issued on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their staffers, economists, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the service was aware its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the general population better identify interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out additional details from in and around Westminster, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants public figures to recognize that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, though the recent actions occur after the embarrassing failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for China – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its successor: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person participates in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
A natural question, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Digital Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate people over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between genuine connections and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone quickly marginal becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless activities at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold below the level of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless efforts to identify secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be challenging, to display influence and because it can.